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Sustainability issues in public procurement of ferry 
services 
Executive summary  
Short description of the output 
This report brings together the activity from the Institute for Sustainability and UCL Energy 
Institute to explore the effects of EU policy regulation on ferry operations.  UCL Energy 
Institute investigated the sustainability issues related to public procurement of ferry services 
in the North Sea Region. This report identifies the key drivers for public procurement and 
identifies some of the challenges that ferry operators and procurers can face. The report 
begins with a brief overview of the procurement process in EU and the problems that are 
currently being faced in the EU ferries sector. 
 
This report highlights how different types of ‘split incentives’ can stymie attempts to improve 
quality or sustainability of ferry services through the tender and procurement process.   
 
Policy recommendations that can avoid, alleviate or minimise the issues of split incentives 
include: 
 Policies that target the design based efficiencies, such as the EEDI 
 Policies that incentivise the improvements in operational or in-service efficiency of ferries 
 Revisiting some aspects of public procurement and standardising them for uniform 
application across all the member states 
 
This report, coupled with the iTransfer Ferry Toolkit, produced by SEStran, forms a 
comprehensive guidance to all operators and procurers of ferry services in the North Sea 
Region and beyond.    
 
This report is part of iTransfer, a North Sea Region Interreg programme project, which is 
funded by the European Regional Development Fund.  For more information visit 
www.itransferproject.eu  
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1 Introduction 
Ferries play an important role in the transportation of people and goods. Globally, it is estimated 
that over two billion passengers, 252 million cars, 677,000 buses and 32 million trailers were carried 
in around eight million trips globally in 2009 (Wergeland 2012). It is difficult to define the ferry 
market as it constitutes of various overlapping segments, as shown in Error! Reference source not 
found.. The European region is one of the most ferry intensive markets accounting for 35% of global 
passenger traffic volume and between 60% to 80% for global vehicular traffic volumes, concentrated 
around the Northern Europe, the Baltic and the Mediterranean regions, with Greece being one of 
the largest ferry nations (Wergeland 2012). 
 
Figure 1: Defining the ferry market 
Source: Wergeland (2012) 
 
The long-term viability of the ferry industry is dependent on its various interconnections with 
ecological, environmental, economic and human systems. There are myriad issues that the industry 
is currently facing and would be facing in the future. These issues are both local and global, ranging 
from air pollution to noise pollution and from human safety to marine biodiversity. Some of the key 
environmental issues that are affecting the ferry industry are: 
 Air quality at ports 
 Greenhouse gas emissions (GHG’s) 
 Introduction of native and non-native invasive species 
 Erosion due to vessel wake 
 Collisions with cetaceans 
 Risk of collisions and spillage and detrimental effects on water quality 
 Litter from ferry passengers 
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Perhaps the most pressing issue for the industry are GHG emissions causing climate change and its 
mitigation. The Ropax and pax-only1 fleet represented just under 3% (28 million tonnes) of the 
emissions from shipping in 2012 (Smith et al. 2014). To that effect, the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO), the EU and the member states have agreed to various targets, to which the EU 
ferry sector will be subject. For example, the EU has key policy and strategy documents in the form 
of white papers and sector strategic communications and newly proposed legislation namely; 
 2009-2018 maritime transport strategy (European Commission 2009) 
 Single EU transport policy roadmap (European Commission 2011) 
 EU integrated maritime policy/strategy (European Commission 2012) 
 Monitoring Reporting and Verification regulations (European Commission 2013a) 
 EU ship recycling regulation (European Commission 2013b) 
 Integrating maritime transport emissions in EU GHG reduction policies (European Commission 
2013c) 
The UK, through its Climate Change Act 2008, has agreed to 80% reduction of CO2 emissions below 
1990 levels by 2050 and it is expected that shipping (including the ferry sector) will be part of the 
budgeting framework to deliver the 2050 target. Similarly, the Scottish Government climate change 
policy aims to reduce GHG emissions, including a 50% reduction by 2030 and 80% reduction by 2050.  
1.1 Aims and objectives 
This report forms part of the delivery of the iTransfer INTERREG project. iTransfer (Innovative 
Transport Solutions for Fjords, Estuaries and Rivers) aims to make ferry transport more freely 
accessible and sustainable, and encourage more people to travel by water. In areas in the North Sea 
Region (NSR) there are opportunities to replace existing vehicle routes with passenger ferries as a 
viable alternative. Travelling by ferry is more sustainable, easier and quicker. It can also provide 
lifeline services to remote communities. 
This report aims to examine EU ferry policies with specific focus on public procurement and 
tendering of ferry services in the North Sea Region and the sustainability issues (specifically energy 
efficiency and GHGs) in the procurement of ferry services.  
  
                                                             
1 RoPax is a vessel that carries cars as well as passengers, Pax-only carries passengers only 
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2 EU ferry policy and regulations 
Desk research was completed by the Institute for Sustainability to identify policies relating to ferry 
operations, however little was found at regional and national level.  At an EU level, no specific 
directives for ferries were identified, rather a number of transport documents which set the wider 
context, including:  
• ‘A Sustainable Future for Transport’ (June 2009): Looking at developing an Integrated, 
technology-led and user-friendly transport system. 
• ‘Maritime Transport Strategy 2018’ (January 2009): Identifies key areas where action by 
the EU will strengthen the competitiveness of the sector while enhancing its 
environmental performance.  
• ‘Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource 
efficient transport system’ (White Paper, 2011): a roadmap to build a competitive 
transport system that will increase mobility, remove major barriers in key areas and fuel 
growth and employment. At the same time, the proposals will dramatically reduce 
Europe's dependence on imported oil and cut carbon emissions in transport by 60% by 
2050. This includes the key goal of a cut of at least 40% in shipping emissions by 2050.  
At national and regional level, the lack of specific policy was confirmed through discussions with 
iTransfer partners at a policy workshop hosted by Damen Shipyards in May 2013 and in subsequent 
exchanges with partners. The area is only very broadly covered in more general transport, maritime 
and ports policy documents with no specific directives on ferries. The one exception at regional level 
is the Scottish Ferries Review and Plan.  
The ‘Scottish Ferries Review’ was initiated by the Scottish Government in June 2008, leading to the 
Scottish Ferry Plan of 2012 providing a long term strategy to 2022.  
The review recognised:  
• the key role of ferries in sustaining and enabling economic development  
• the lack of consistent approach to the funding and procurement of ferry services  
• the lack of consistent approach of who should be responsible for the delivery of ferry 
services  
• there was no existing policy to determine what services and routes should be funded, or 
what the level of service should be.  
The aims of the Plan:  
• to provide a shared vision and outcomes for ferry services in Scotland, in the context of 
the Government’s Purpose, Economic Strategy and National Transport Strategy  
• to analyse the current lifeline ferry services and network, identifying how well it meets 
the proposed outcomes and how it links to other modal networks  
• to inform the Scottish Government’s long term plan for lifeline ferry services in Scotland 
and influence the next round of procurement of ferry service.  
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• to identify policies to be taken forward to deliver the long term plan, including the 
planned investment framework.  
iTransfer partners have found this approach of great interest. However, as discussed in the 
workshop, the Scottish model is fairly unique and difficult to apply to other countries. This raised the 
question of whether the lack of policy is actually exacerbating procurement and operational issues 
identified elsewhere.  
There are various policies and regulations relating to emissions control of the shipping sector that do 
affect ferry operators and the industry.  These include IMO and EU MARPOL regulation or sulphur 
Directive (SECA); monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV); Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI).  
The influence of policy on efficiency, procurement and tendering are discussed in UCL’s 
Sustainability issues in public procurement of ferry services and SEStran’s Ferry tendering toolkit 
(available at http://www.itransferproject.eu/itransfer-impact/project-results/tendering-ferry-
services/)    
The influence of policy and regulation on design for new vessels and management of existing fleet 
operations have been discussed by partners at transnational design workshops held by Damen and 
TESO.  In order to ensure their ferry fleets will meet the forthcoming requirements related to 
emissions and efficiency, ferry operators need to consider future fuel strategies for both their 
existing and new vessels.  Sustainable vessel design has focused on reducing energy requirements, 
through hull design, efficiencies of hotel load, however fuel decisions have been related to 
infrastructure and technology available, and we have seen that the economics of different fuel 
strategies vary with location.  For example, LNG was the most efficient fuel choice for Damen, and 
CNG favored by TESO.  Outside of the iTransfer partnership other operators have found hydrogen 
vessels economic to develop (CMAL, with EU subsidy support) 
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3 Cross project implications matrix  
There are various policies and regulations that affect ferry operators and the industry.  These include 
IMO and EU MARPOL regulation or Sulphur Directive (SECA); monitoring, reporting and verification 
(MRV), Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI).  These will affect all areas of marine transport and 
logistics, not ferry services alone.  
From our research we have identified that design of new vessels, retrofit and efficiency of existing 
vessels, infrastructure and supply of fuel, and wider impacts such as emissions of greenhouse gases 
and pollutants, are challenging areas for the industry as a whole. 
To identify common themes and priorities of emerging policies we have looked to other projects and 
programmes, and their findings related to different aspects of maritime transport and the we 
present the combined research and recommendations from these projects below (Table 1). 
The Maritime Transport Cluster r2 Policy Paper “Maritime Transport and Future Policies - 
Perspectives from the North Sea Region” is a compilation of results generated by the North Sea 
Region Programme project Maritime Transport Cluster in 2011/12. It comprises an analysis of all 
transport related projects within this programme, maritime transport research and the results of a 
consultation with the maritime industry in the North Sea Region. 
LO-PINOD project has focused on building an efficient, balanced and sustainable transport network 
by challenging existing thinking on freight distribution and offering more sustainable and efficient 
alternatives . 
Clean North Sea Shipping3 objectives has been to improve the environmental and health situation 
caused by air pollution and greenhouse gases from shipping along the North Sea coast and within 
North Sea ports. 
Low Carbon Shipping – A Systems Approach4, was a research project funded by the UK Engineering 
and Physical Sciences Research Council (£1.7m) and a number of industry partners to develop 
greater understanding of global shipping systems and the complex interplay between principal 
components (port operations, owner/operator relationships, ship design) to identify concepts for 
cost-effective reduction of carbon emissions and future trends for technical impacts and policy 
solutions.   
The collaboration has continued into the Shipping in Changing Climates, a recently initiated 
research project funded by the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (£3.5m 
funded for 3.5 years), Lloyds Register, Rolls Royce, Shell, BMT and MSI . The SCC project seeks to 
understand the scope for greater energy efficiency of the supply side, understand the demand side 
drivers and understanding the supply and demand interactions in shipping. 
                                                             
2 http://www.maritimetransportcluster.eu/  
3 http://cnss.no/  
4 http://www.lowcarbonshipping.co.uk/  
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Weastflows5 is an Interreg IVB North West Europe (NWE) project funded by the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) that aims to encourage a shift towards greener freight transport in the 
NWE region.  Efficient and sustainable freight transport is essential to help deliver economic, social 
and environmental benefits to communities and businesses. 
Table 1 Core issues for sustainable transport, policy and regulations and outcomes from different EU 
projects and programmes. 
Project Design of new vessels Retrofit and efficiency 
of existing vessels 
Infrastructure and 
supply of fuel 
Wider impacts 
iTransfer Sustainable ferry design 
approaches completed to 
enable reduced emissions 
and meeting SECA 
Eco drive principles and 
behaviour change can 
improve fuel efficiencies  
Suitability of alternative 
fuels (LNG,CNG, H2, 
hybrid) explored.  Choices 
depend in infrastructure 
availability  
LNG and CNG bunkering 
can lead to methane 
emissions, a more potent 
greenhouse gas than CO2. 
Maritime 
transport 
cluster 
recommen
dations 
Support investment into 
sustainable maritime 
transport  
Continue to focus on 
development and efficient 
use of green technology 
Prioritise research into ship 
design and environmental 
impacts of marine 
transport. 
Accessibility is a priority 
and further projects to 
develop efficient transport 
are needed. 
Focus on issues of ship 
recycling 
Promote incentive 
schemes to improve 
environmental 
performance 
Focus on green 
infrastructure provision (eg 
LNG, on-shore power 
supply)  
Integrate ports with 
hinterland to facilitate 
efficient connection of sea 
and land transport 
Ferries have impact on 
territorial cohesion, 
accessibility and regional 
development so should be 
prioritised for future 
funding 
Increase co-operation 
between local, national 
and European research 
initiatives 
Low 
Carbon 
Shipping 
Forum 
The project looked into 
various innovative and 
energy efficient designs of 
new ships from the naval 
architecture and marine 
engineering perspective, 
which fed into the ship 
impact model. The ship 
impact model could then be 
used to identify impact of 
technologies on the ship 
design in a holistic sense 
and act as an interface 
between the technology 
assessments and the global 
shipping model.  
Operational efficiency 
measures were shown to 
be of significant 
importance to transition 
towards low carbon 
shipping. The relationship 
between the ship speed 
and power requirements to 
propel the ship presents a 
substantial opportunity for 
energy efficiency. Survey 
of 150 shipowner-
operators showed that not 
all operational measures 
were being implemented 
and the measures with 
highest fuel saving 
potential had between 50-
70% implementation rate 
A shift to LNG offers 
significant improvements 
but also requires major 
changes in ship design and 
shipping infrastructure, 
and still can only deliver 
modest reductions in 
transport carbon intensity. 
Bioenergy is expected to 
be supply-constrained, 
solar energy provides 
insufficient power outputs, 
and the evaluation of the 
potential of wind-
assistance shows that its 
potential and future role 
remain uncertain. 
Given the expected long-
term growth which is the 
backdrop to the emissions 
trajectories of the shipping 
industry, the changes 
investigated in the project 
are unlikely to achieve 
progress proportionate to 
shipping’s responsibilities 
(as taken from the 
Copenhagen Accord) under 
the current tendency 
towards ‘business as usual’. 
There is therefore a need 
to develop further 
voluntary measures or 
regulation (market-based 
or command and- control 
measures). 
                                                             
5 http://www.weastflows.eu/  
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Project Design of new vessels Retrofit and efficiency 
of existing vessels 
Infrastructure and 
supply of fuel 
Wider impacts 
Clean 
North Sea 
Shipping 
Proposed postponement of 
NOX limitations for new 
build ships will lead to 
between 11-15% higher 
NOX concentration in NSR 
 
Improved 
incentive/indexing 
schemes through 
implementation of MRV  
LNG reduces emissions of 
all air pollutants, while 
scrubbers reduce sulphur 
emissions only and 
increase fuel consumption. 
EU funds should support 
retrofitting of ships to 
reduce NOX & PM. 
Development of onshore 
power supply and LNG 
bunkering is lagging 
behind ships needs 
Incentive schemes should 
be used on large scale for 
development of clean 
harbours 
Methane slip from LNG is 
an issue that needs to be 
minimised 
Differentiated port dues 
should be mandatory and 
standardised for all 
harbours 
LO-PINOD  Costs associated with 
meeting SECA discussed, 
including c€1m cost for 
retrofit of scrubber 
technology  
Regional ports are keen to 
explore bunkering of 
alternative fuels to 
diversify port operations 
and create business 
opportunities 
Scrubbing and exhaust 
treatment technologies to 
enable MGO to meet 
Marpol are energy 
intensive, reduce fuel 
efficiency and increase CO2 
emissions.  
E-
Harbours 
  Translates Smart Grid best 
practise into policies and 
near future planning by 
identification of obstacles 
and lessons learned 
Provides overview of smart 
grid applications and 
quantifies environmental 
and financial viability of 
smart grids and electric 
mobility 
WeastFlo
ws 
 Policy advisory group have 
been considering the 
impacts of SECA on freight 
routes and modal shift. 
 Focus on ICT mapping and 
routes to develop green 
supply routes and 
encourage modal shift  
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4 The procurement process for ferry services 
This section discusses the fundamentals of the EU ferry tendering policies and processes that are 
thought to give rise to the issues relating to sustainability of ferries in the EU region.  
Economic theory suggests that given certain assumptions (e.g. free entry and exit, known prices) 
competitive markets will cause efficient resource allocation (Begg & Ward 2009). When any one of 
these assumptions is violated, market failures will result and there would be a need for public sector 
intervention (Sorrell et al. 2004). The ferry market is an example, where in certain cases markets are 
not perfectly competitive making them economically unviable and as a result there is a lack of 
services provided in that market. From a public sector perspective the delivery of ferry services to 
such markets poses a dilemma. The public sector may seek to guarantee a minimum level of service 
to a particular community even though such a service might not be commercially viable but at the 
same time the public sector needs to secure an operator that provides a continued service at an 
efficient cost level, but with the lowest subsidy rate possible, whilst also ensuring that important 
aspects of service quality are maintained or improved (Baird & Wilmsmeier 2011), such as the 
lifeline ferry services which operate to isolated communities in Scotland.  
Thus, an EU member state can impose a Public Service Obligation (PSO) in order to ensure an 
adequate regular ferry service to and from a given location where operators, in considering their 
own commercial interests, would not provide an adequate level of service or under the same 
conditions (Baird, Wilmsmeier & Boglev 2010). A PSO would include the ports to be served, 
regularity, continuity, frequency and capacity, rates to be charged and manning of vessels. PSOs can 
be imposed through Public Service Contracts (PSC) with individual operators on a given route or 
through a licensing system for all operators on a given route. At times it is not clear as to which 
instrument comes first in order to justify public intervention, but the commonly held view is that a 
PSO is established first and followed by a PSC with a specific operator, although in some cases a PSO 
can be defined within the PSC6. The PSO and the PSC therefore are the basis on which compensation 
for operation in economically unviable7 route is to be given.  
4.1 Regulations 
The procurement of ferry services within the EU needs to be compatible with national and EU law. 
The EU council regulation No. 3577/92 (the Cabotage regulation) regulates the transportation of 
passengers and goods by sea between two points within member states of the EU. The essence of 
the regulation is to allow free movement of services and enable operators to operate freely within 
the European market. Recognising the needs for transport of passengers and goods of certain 
islands, exceptions to the free movement are allowed, giving member states power to intervene by 
imposing PSOs and providing compensation to operators through PSCs. The ‘Cabotage Regulation’ 
requires that, for both imposing PSOs and concluding PSCs, the Member State shall do so in a non-
                                                             
6 For example in the case of Altmark, the EC concluded that PSO’s were clearly defined in the PSC for Clyde & Hebrides and 
Northern Isles contracts.  
7 This is identified if no operator asks for operating permission on a specific route 
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discriminatory basis in respect of all community shipowners8 (operators) and therefore any 
compensation must be available to all community ship owners. The interaction of EU regulations and 
the actions of national bodies is outlined in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: EU regulations and actions of governments in procurement of ferry services  
 
4.2 Subsidies 
Operators (referred to as ‘community ship-owners’ in EC regulation) are entitled to apply for 
compensation in exchange for accepting PSOs and since prices are insufficient to make the services 
economically viable, ferry companies receive government subsidies. Careful consideration needs to 
be given to subsidies as they can fall foul of EU restrictions on state aid, thus the process of granting 
subsidies needs to comply with the four ‘Altmark’ criteria; 
1. The receiving undertaking must actually have PSOs to discharge and these must be clearly 
defined; 
2. The basis of compensation must be calculated in an objective and transparent manner; 
3. Compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover the costs in discharging the PSO - taking 
into account relevant receipts and a reasonable profit; 
                                                             
8 Defined as (a) nationals of a member state established in a member state and pursuing shipping activities; (b) shipping 
companies of a member state and whose principal place of business is situated, and effective control exercised, in a 
Member State; or (c) nationals/shipping companies of member state established outside the community and controlled by 
nationals of a member state, if their ships are registered in and fly the flag of a member state 
EU cabotage regulation – Free movement & operation within EU waters 
Non-commercially viable but important routes are identified 
State imposes a PSO and enters in a PSC – restricting free movement & operation in EU waters 
To comply with EU regulation, the state must select an operator in a non-discriminatory 
manner e.g. competitive tendering 
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4. If the undertaking concerned is not chosen under a public procurement procedure, then the 
level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis of an analysis of costs which an 
efficient undertaking would have incurred. 
The above criteria give rise to several questions and especially the last two criteria have the 
potential to affect the sustainability of the ferry services provided. There are two main types of 
subsidies; net subsidy and gross subsidy contracts. In a net subsidy contract the ferry operator is 
granted all the revenue to cover the costs of operation and therefore the subsidy will only be for the 
difference between revenue and the acceptable profit. Net contracts therefore give the operators an 
incentive to increase revenue. Airlines and ferry routes are typically operated on net contracts. 
In a gross subsidy contract the operator collects the fares on behalf of the government/authority. 
That is, the companies operate on ‘gross cost’ contracts in which each company receives a subsidy 
from the government in order to cover their costs. The operator bids for the full operating costs, and 
all revenue goes to the authority. The use of gross contracts reduces the risk of the operator since 
they do not need to estimate demand and will normally give lower bids since there is a lower risk 
premium in each bid. This option also makes it easier to create free transfer between operators. In 
Sweden gross contracts are the dominant contract form. The Norwegian experience has shown that 
gross cost term contracts have higher transaction costs and lack incentives for companies to 
enhance demand and consequently revenue (Baird, Wilmsmeier & Boglev 2010). 
 
4.3 Tendering 
Tendering has been suggested as a means to induce cost efficiency and thus reductions in the costly 
subsidies (Sunde 1999). The Commission takes the view that any public service contract is potentially 
discriminatory between community ship-owners.  As such, the Commission considers that launching 
an open, community-wide procurement process is the best way to ensure non-discrimination, 
regardless of whether national or EU procurement law requires such an approach.  Thus tendering 
can be viewed as creating competition for access to a market at set point in time instead of 
continuous competition within the market. Ferry tendering is covered by two EU public procurement 
policies;  
 Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 
coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport 
and postal services sectors (30.04.2004). 
 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the 
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and 
public service contracts (30.04.2004). 
 
There are several types of tenders, details of which are provided in SEStran’s Ferry Toolkit, however 
it should be noted that the only permissible criteria for award of a public contract are; lowest price 
or most economically advantageous tender (MEAT), both of which have potential for affecting the 
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sustainability choices made in provision of ferry services. MEAT must include price and some aspects 
of quality, such as:  
 
 Deliverability of the services within the agreed time scale  
 Technical merit and innovation 
 Level of risk accepted by the tenderer 
 Proposals relating to health and safety  
 Proposals of dealing with environmental issues (protection of the environment) 
 Service assistance 
 Social considerations - positive action towards disabled persons, promotion of equality between 
men and women and promotion of ethnic/racial diversity.  
 
When awarding a contract on MEAT which is the more commonly used, the criteria must be 
weighted either as an exact number (e.g. price: 25%) or within a meaningful range (e.g. price: 20%-
30%). As an example, in Denmark the selection criteria have evolved from lowest price to MEAT in 
the 3rd round, with price weighted at 70%, flexibility, frequency and security weighted at 20% and 
ferry quality at 10% (Baird & Wilmsmeier 2011). 
 
A subsidy corresponds to the bid which is a function of future revenues, future costs and a 
reasonable profit. The winning bid which may be the lowest bid or MEAT bid would aim to increase 
revenue and reduce costs, given PSO and PSC constraints on revenue through the Altmark criteria. 
The criteria suggest that compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover the costs in 
discharging the public service obligation - taking into account relevant receipts and a reasonable 
profit and If the undertaking concerned is not chosen under a public procurement procedure, then 
the level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis of an analysis of costs which an 
efficient undertaking would have incurred (Baird, Wilmsmeier & Boglev 2010). Future costs are 
directly related to energy efficiency (as shown in 4.6), both technological and operational, therefore 
the definition of ‘reasonable’ costs and profits should preferably include energy efficiency 
considerations. 
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4.4 Transnational comparative analysis: co-financing for different 
public transport modes in the NSR 
When tendering for ferry services the scope and scale of subsidies available can affect the 
attractiveness of different routes for prospective operators. Subsidies can also affect the delivery of 
sustainable ferry services. 
When it comes to good practise for tendering for bus services in the UK, it is recommended that the 
minimum level of subsidy should be included in the invitation to tender9.  
The UK Department for Transport recognises that public subsidy arrangements can be useful to 
kickstart commercial road transport operations, such as tapering financial support over a short 
period (typically three years) intended to deliver services that are commercially viable upon 
completion10.  
The same report recognises the potential for public sector and operators to share rewards as well as 
risks of services.  In the UK this typically applies to provision of park and ride services, or where 
existing routes aren’t available so the commercial viability of such routes are untested.   
Research on German rail company tenders has identified that on average 11 companies requested 
tender documentation but an average of only 4 bids were submitted.  The evidence11 suggests two 
factors will influence the number of bidders.  Number of bidders increases with percentage of risk 
assumed by the public transport authority for price increases on input factors like personnel or fuel; 
and the level of revenue risk to be assumed by the operator.  A high level of uncertainty will reduce 
authorities’ efficiency gains by reducing competition and making it necessary for operators to 
calculate an increased risk premium.   
This evidence from German rail tenders shows that authorities using competitive tendering 
processes should be aware that uncertainty can influence operators’ interest in submitting tender 
returns.  Therefore tenders should avoiding placing excessive risks on operators as this will reduce 
their efficiency gains and by implication their sustainability improvements.  Failure to do so can 
result in reduced competition and fewer returns, but also higher value returns based on higher risk 
and uncertainty.  In order to successfully deliver sustainable operations tenders should aim to 
reduce risks and uncertainties for operators to encourage high numbers of competitive bid returns.   
One key difference between road and ferry transport: 
 Investment costs.  The average cost of a new bus is €445,00012, while a new ferry can cost 
€34m13.  Given that a bus tender may be for service provision of 3 years, a competitive case 
                                                             
9http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/regional/buses/tendering/enderingg
oodpracticeguid3582.pdf 
10 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/254392/tendering-road-
passenger-transport-contracts.pdf 
11 http://www.ejtir.tudelft.nl/issues/2011_01/pdf/2011_01_01.pdf 
12 http://www.mayorwatch.co.uk/tfl-reveals-cost-of-new-bus-for-london-fleet/ 
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can be built to allow for investment in vehicles, especially where there is subsidy, kick-start 
funding or shared risk/reward arrangements.  For ferry services tendered under the similar 
circumstances a competitive business case is harder to establish, especially with the 
considerable costs of the vessels.   
 Infrastructure requirements.  An added complication may arise on the bespoke nature of 
ferry landings.  Each port or quay may have different infrastructure, so operators may not 
be able to move vessels between routes as easily as bus operators.   
  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
13 http://www.itransferproject.eu/media-lib/Key-Achievements-and-lessons-learned_Integration-tendering-
and-policy.pdf 
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4.5 Procurement flow chart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Public procurement process of ferries 
 
4.6 Measures to improve energy efficiency  
As mentioned in the Introduction, one of the key environmental issues affecting the ferry industry is 
that of GHGs. Several methods have been identified for improving energy efficiency, thereby 
reducing GHGs and mitigating effects of climate change. Generally these options have been classed 
as either technical or operational fuel saving measures14. It is suggested that fuel costs in shipping 
generally account for 50% of a ships operating costs, a share which is set to increase as fuel costs 
increase, generating an even greater incentive for the implementation of energy saving and CO2 
abatement measures (Baird, Wilmsmeier, & Boglev, Scottish Ferries Review, Part A: Methods of ferry 
delivery and operation, competition and procurement, and environmental issues, 2010). Thus, if a 
vessel is able to improve its energy efficiency it will result in lower fuel bills and direct CO2 emission 
reductions, resulting in a win-win situation. It has been suggested that the potential for saving 
                                                             
14 1 tonne of Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO), most commonly used fuel on board ships, is equivalent to 3.14 tonnes of 
CO2 
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energy and emissions (as shown in Table 2) using known technology and practices are significant and 
in the range of 25% - 75% (Buhaug, et al., 2009). More than fifty measures have been identified that 
could result in efficiency gains and they are generally grouped as technical measures (some 
applicable to new and some to existing ships/retrofits) and operational measures.  
 Saving (%) of CO2/tonne-mile Combined Combined  
DESIGN   
25 – 75% 
Concept, speed & capability 2 – 50%* 
10 – 50% 
Hull and superstructure 2 – 20% 
Power and propulsion systmes 5 – 15% 
Low-carbon fuels 5 – 15%** 
Renewable energy 1 – 10% 
Exhaust gas CO2 reduction 0 
OPERATIONS   
Fleet management, logistics & incentives 5 – 50% 
10 – 50% Voyage optimasation 1 – 10% 
Energy management 1 – 10% 
* Reductions at this level would required speed reductions 
** CO2 equivalent based on the use of LNG 
Table 2: Assessment of options for reduction of CO2 emissions from shipping 
Source: Buhaug et al. (2009) IMO 2nd GHG study 
Newer ferries could make a significant contribution to the environmental objective, by reducing CO2 
emissions through energy-efficient hull design, energy efficient engines, lower-friction hull coatings, 
on-ship energy efficiency systems and greater use of low carbon technology (e.g. bio-diesel and 
hybrid powered engines). Existing ferries could also make a significant contribution to the reduction 
of CO2 through changes in operational practices, use of weather routing, autopilot adjustments etc. 
(see iTransfer Ferry Operations case Study and Ferry Design case study). 
 
4.7 Problem context 
Time series analysis from Baird & Wilmsmeier (2011) and Baird, Wilmsmeier & Boglev (2010) of 
several EU member states has shown that ferry subsidies have been rising despite the competitive 
tendering of ferry services introduced in many EU member states. Tendering procedures that are 
thought to improve the prevalent ferry services in terms of value for money for the consumers and 
public agencies is not yielding the desired or expected results. Moreover research from Førsund 
(1993), Minken & Killi (2001), Bråthen et al. (2004) and Odeck & Bråthen (2007) show that there are 
unrealised cost efficiency gains in the range 10% - 30% in the EU ferry links analysed. Brathen et al. 
(2004) also show that tendered ferry links did not outperform non-tendered ferry links and that the 
subsidizing authorities do not seem to impact on the performance of ferry links. These findings have 
important implications on the efficacy of the public procurement of ferry services through tendering, 
as they suggest production costs (e.g. labour, capital, fuel) are not minimised, therefore suggesting 
that energy efficiency savings may be forgone in certain situations. 
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Although there is no substantial evidence on this subject in the context of ferry services, some 
evidence can be gleaned from existing analysis. In Greece, where the state does not get involved 
with the ownership of the vessels, non-commercially viable routes that are subsidised by the state 
attract older ferries of ‘lower’ quality (Baird, Wilmsmeier, & Boglev, Scottish Ferries Review, Part A: 
Methods of ferry delivery and operation, competition and procurement, and environmental issues, 
2010). The same can be said for Scotland, where the state is heavily involved in the ownership of 
vessels (through CMAL), the average fleet age is nearing replacement age and in some routes 
beyond their useful economic life of circa 25 years. In contrast, better quality vessels are deployed in 
profitable and competitive routes that carry significant tourist and local traffic, as well as commercial 
traffic in Greece. This suggests that, despite being subsidised, uneconomic routes offer reduced 
return for operators and that public procurement of ferry services does not create the right 
commercial environment so as to incentivise investment in energy efficiency by operators.   
From the small islands perspective, several islands (including Orkney and Bornholm) have shown 
that the public procurement tendering procedure given in community legislation for the 
implementation of PSO has not, for various reasons, given good results, and seems to have created 
more problems than it has solved, such as drops in the quality of service, costs which are higher at 
the end of the day, conflicts, etc. (Islands Commission, 2005) 
Despite the low cost and MEAT tendering criteria, it seems that energy efficiency of ferries is being 
overlooked, for example when factors such as speed and age of vessels are decided upon in the 
tendering process. As such there is a lack of standardised application of EU policy on the subject of 
ferry procurement by member states in their PSOs and PSCs, for example, duration of PSCs range 
from one (Greece) to twenty years (Italy).  
There is currently a strong need for the renewal of the EU’s ferry fleet15. Figure 4 shows that almost 
half of the EU flagged ferries are above the age category 21 – 25 and Figure 5 shows that the average 
age of the existing EU flagged fleet is around 25 years. This suggests a sizeable opportunity exists in 
the renewal of the fleet at the target renewal age, although the actual renewal age is around 30 
years in the EU (Grant Thornton, 2010). The replacement of the ageing fleet will bring to market 
several energy efficiency technological innovations which itself creates fuel efficiencies of around 
10% when comparing ships from 1980 to 2010 (Grant Thornton, 2010). Research by Odeck & 
Bråthen (2007) indicates that the vintage year has a direct impact on the efficiency of ferries and the 
most likely explanation again is that newer ferries are more fuel efficient than older ones. 
                                                             
15 Defined by flag states, which may under-represent the actual number of ferries in operation in EU waters.  
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Figure 4: Distribution of EU flagged ferries16              
Source: Clarksons World Fleet Register (2014) 
 
 
Figure 5: Average age of EU member states fleet             
Source: Clarksons World Fleet Register (2014) 
  
                                                             
16 Ferries aged above 50 years and in-service were removed from the analysis 
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5 Methodology 
This research uses the framework developed in Rehmatulla (2014) to investigate issues affecting 
energy efficiency in the ferry sector. The framework compares the perceptions of barriers or issues 
to observed level of barriers or issues using a mixed methods approach and a specific economic 
theory, agency theory, which has been helpful in explaining issues around energy efficiency.  
The agency theory is directed at the ubiquitous agency relationship, in which one party (the 
principal) delegates work to another (the agent) who performs that work (Ross 1986, cited by 
Eisenhardt 1989) or when one individual depends on the action of another (Pratt & Zeckhauser, 
1985). The theory aims to resolve two key agency problems that occur as a result of this relationship: 
 Problem 1: The desires or the goals of the principal and agent conflict (split incentives problem) 
 Problems 2: It is difficult or expensive to verify the agent’s actions (informational problem) 
5.1 Principal agent problems 
When agency theory is applied to discuss barriers to energy efficiency, the term principal agent 
problems is used. Principal agent problem results in several cases that suggest optimal or sub 
optimal outcomes for investment in energy efficiency. The principal agent problem arises from an 
agency relationship. The principal agent problem as a barrier in energy efficiency arises in:  
“transactions when the entity responsible for making investment decisions is not the party 
responsible for paying future costs of operation caused by that investment” (Vernon & Meier 2012, 
p 267).  
It has long been recognised that principal agent problems are pervasive in the buildings sector, both 
residential and commercial rental markets (for which it has been referred to as the landlord-tenant 
problem) by Blumstein et al. (1980), Jaffe & Stavins (1994), Lovins (1992), Fisher & Rothkopf (1989), 
IEA (2007) etc. Apart from the rental markets (or operations), it is thought to be impeding energy 
efficiency at design and construction as well. For example in construction of buildings, builders do 
not optimise for energy efficiency in order to hold construction costs down (e.g. developers choosing 
to install electric space heating, even though for tenants this is more expensive than gas) and 
because their productivity is measured in different scales (Lovins 1992 and IEA 2007). In the rental 
market, landlords will generally not purchase efficient devices for rental properties since the tenants 
pay the cost of operating the devices (Jaffe and Stavins 1994; Murtishaw & Sathaye 2006; Maruejols 
& Young 2011) thus the tenant pays energy costs that are largely determined by the infrastructure 
present in the building, which is subject to landlord’s decision. Similarly, landlords may not maintain 
the devices well when tenants pay the operating costs (Murtishaw and Sathaye 2006). Generally, the 
landlord has no incentive to make energy efficient investment as only the tenant directly benefits 
from these reduced costs, which insulates the landlord from energy price signals. These findings 
from the buildings sector suggest that principal agent problems in context of energy efficiency could 
possibly exist in other sectors, where there are similar contractual arrangements. These problems 
have also been witnessed in the shipping sector (Rehmatulla, 2014) and it is plausible that they may 
have implications in energy efficiency in the ferries sector.  
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In some cases though, where markets are efficient this problem may not hold, as a landlord who has 
invested in energy efficiency of his building should be compensated with higher rent. Thus, the 
principal agent problem is a function of several different conditions such as the number of 
contracting entities, length of contracts, apportionment of costs and the level of information. The 
above however are only related to one type of contract that is prevalent in the rental markets (this 
classical landlord-tenant relationship is depicted in Figure 6 ), where the tenant (the principal) pays 
rent to the landlord (agent) in exchange for the use of the building and additionally pays energy 
costs. According to Meier and Eide (2007) and IEA (2007) up to four different relationships are 
possible depending between the contract between the parties as shown below in Table 3. 
 
According to the above sources, different questions have been put forward to determine whether 
the end use is affected by principal agent problem. According to Murtishaw and Sathaye (2006) the 
following three questions must be answered: 
 Who uses the device? 
 Who selects the device? 
 Who pays the energy cost? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Classical tenant-landlord problem 
By categorising who is responsible for energy costs and energy purchases (as shown in Table 3) the 
principal agent problem can arise from two kinds of split incentives, one concerning usage (demand 
for energy services) and other concerning the technical efficiency of the end use device (Murtishaw 
and Sathaye 2006). 
 End user can chose technology End user cannot chose technology 
End user pays energy 
bill 
No principal agent problem.  
Case 1 
Efficiency problem.  
Case 2 
End user does not pay 
energy bill 
Usage and efficiency problem. 
Case 3 
Usage problem.  
Case 4 
Table 3: Transactions from an end user perspective 
The questions are extended by IEA (2007) and Meier and Eide (2007), to include the following: 
 Who selects the energy using technology? 
Agent 
Landlord 
Space 
Principal  
Tenant 
Rent 
Energy 
Payments 
Energy efficiency 
investment 
Energy efficiency 
operation 
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 Who purchases the energy using technology? 
 Who pays the energy bill?  
 Who owns the energy using technology? 
 Who controls operation of the energy-using technology?  
In case one, the end user (e.g. dwelling occupant) selects the energy-using technology (e.g. 
refrigerator, etc.), selects its energy efficiency and pays for its energy consumption, thus the end 
user will be incentivised to make a reasonable investment in energy efficiency (although this may be 
affected by other barriers that may be present). In this case it can be said that no principal agent 
problem exists because the principal and agent are the same entity (IEA 2007) or the principal makes 
the energy efficiency investment and pays the energy cost. In the context of energy efficiency this is 
the ideal situation because there are no diverging interests between principal and agent, 
information is costless, easily transferred, and all costs and benefits of energy efficiency investment 
are internalised (Vernon and Meier 2012). This situation is illustrated in Figure 7. 
In case two, the end user cannot choose the energy using technology or make an energy efficiency 
investment. Instead, the agent selects the energy-using technology and makes the energy efficiency 
investment, but the end user, i.e. the principal, pays for the energy use. A principal agent problem 
can be said to exist here and is defined as an “efficiency problem”, which refers to the forgone 
energy efficiency investment, referred to in the earlier example of the classical tenant-landlord 
problem. In this case, as depicted in Figure 8, the market also fails to provide adequate information 
on energy efficiency to the principal (IEA 2007) resulting in adverse selection by the principal (due to 
agent’s pre contractual opportunism) or the inability of the agent to recoup the investment in 
energy efficiency. Other examples of this situation are in the car rentals business, sale and purchase 
of capital equipment and appliances.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 7: Case one of the principal agent problem 
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Figure 8: Case two, efficiency problem in principal agent problems 
In case four the end user is neither able to select the energy-using technology or make the energy 
efficiency investment nor pays the energy cost. This is classed as “usage” problem because the end 
user faces no economic constraint on usage, i.e. the end user consumes more energy than is 
reasonable (Meier and Aide 2007). Examples of this situation are where energy cost or utilities are 
included in the overall rental charge, hotel rooms, etc. The principal pays only indirectly for energy 
use as part of the payment for use of the product or service (IEA 2007). In this case, the agent may 
try to over-invest in efficiency in order to minimise the consequences of unconstrained usage 
problem.  
The research begins with review of literature that feeds into the principal agent analysis above, 
resulting in issues identified from secondary research. Thereafter, interviews as a research method 
are used to cross-examine and validate the findings.  
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6 Issues in ferry procurement processes 
This section provides a description of the problem using secondary research and primary research 
methods. There is a need to first have a good description of the problem, i.e. through descriptive 
questions that aim to address what is actually going on in the ferry tendering process through 
secondary desk research. This secondary research and analysis makes use of the principal agent 
theory, as mentioned in section 3. This section starts by providing an overview of the stakeholders 
involved in the ferry tendering process, the contracts with which they interact and conceptualises 
the principal agent problem in order to assess the level of impact of ferry procurement policies on 
GHG emissions and energy efficiency. 
6.1 Principle agent analysis 
In order to evaluate principal agent problems in the ferry industry, it is first necessary to identify the 
participating firms and understand the basic types of contracts through which they interact. 
Thereafter, it is necessary to identify which entity makes capital or equipment purchasing decisions 
and fuel consumption costs. Systems thinking methods such as the stakeholder mapping tool are 
used in here to depict the stakeholders within the system. Stakeholder mapping tools are used again 
to depict the stakeholders within the different types of contracts and business arrangements (types 
of companies).  
6.1.1 Stakeholder analysis 
In the ferry industry there are various stakeholders that enable it to function and deliver the 
transportation service. However, a few stakeholders, as highlighted in Figure 9, have the largest 
impact on the way that it operates and could potentially affect the sustainability choices during the 
tendering process. These key stakeholders can be grouped into operators and regulators, and 
defined as follows: 
 Ferry operator: Responsible for the direct running of the ferry on a day to day basis. A ferry 
operator can be a long-term bareboat charterer, private operator, community operator, public 
operator (government). 
 Ferry owner: Owns the ferry  and is the ultimate controlling owner who benefits from any profits 
the ship makes (beneficial owner) or can be a company which has commercial control over a 
vessel's operation without owning the ship (disponent owner). 
 Local authority: Responsible for local services including infrastructure and procuring ferry 
services on local routes. 
 Central Government: Responsible for setting national transport policies and providing ferry 
services at a national level. 
 Regional transport partnerships: Responsible for providing ferry services at a regional level. 
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Figure 9: Stakeholders in the ferry industry 
6.1.2 Overview of different types of ferry service delivery options 
There are essentially three ways of delivering ferry services; publicly-owned operators, e.g. 
Caledonian MacBrayne, privately-owned operators, e.g. Rederij Doeksen, and community-owned 
operators, e.g. TESO. Each delivery option gives rise to varying responsibility over costs and risks for 
each stakeholder, as shown in Table 4. 
Capital 
costs 
 New-building or second-hand purchase 
 Debt repayment 
 Interest 
 Retrofit 
 Harbour infrastructure  
Operating 
costs 
 Voyage costs – fuel, port dues, canal dues 
 Operating costs – crewing, repair, dry-docking, maintenance, surveys, insurance 
 Vessel charter costs 
 Insurance  
 Shore costs - Property rental, shore staff wages, insurance, corporate overheads 
Table 4: Capital and operating costs in delivering ferry services 
Ferry 
owner 
Broker 
Port 
/harbour 
operator 
Shipyard 
Local 
authority 
Regional 
Transport 
partnerships 
Central 
government 
European 
Union  
International 
Maritime 
Organisation  
Class 
society 
P&I club 
Insurance 
Ferry Co. 
shareholders 
Port state 
control 
Technology 
providers 
Freight 
customers 
Foot/car 
passenger
s 
Crew 
Fuel 
supplier 
Ferry 
operator 
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Figure 10: Costs from a government and operator perspective            
Source: Grant Thornton (2010) 
 
Besides the three ways of delivery of ferry services, the vessels themselves can be delivered using 
two forms of charter, the time or period charter and the bareboat charter, adding further complexity 
to the allocation of costs in ferry operations. In a time charter, a charterer contracts with an owner-
operator for the use of a crewed vessel for a certain period of time, which may be for a single trip 
(trip charter) or certain length of time (period charter). This contract is similar to hiring a car from a 
rental company (but with the difference that the driver is also included in the hire). A time charterer 
gains the operational control of the ships carrying its cargo, while leaving the ownership and 
management of the ship for the ship-owner. As shown in Table 5 under a time charter, the ship’s 
capital expenditure and some operational control is done by the ship-owner (e.g. providing crew and 
master) but the fuel cost is paid by the charterer in addition to the charter day rate. In ferry 
operations a time charter is entered into when additional sailings are required or when demand is 
high (daily or seasonal). This charter reflects case two as described in 5.1 and can be said to be 
resulting in principal agent efficiency problem. 
A bareboat charter involves the use of a vessel in which the capital expenditure is accrued by the 
bareboat owner and all other costs are borne by the bareboat charterer, as shown in Table 5, similar 
to a long lease in the property market. Unlike in commercial property, the hire charge for the vessel 
is on a per day basis rather than an upfront lump sum. The bareboat charterer obtains possession 
and full control of the vessel along with the legal and financial responsibility for it. Where the ferry 
owner and the ferry operator are a single entity, there can be said to be no principal agent problems 
existing. However there will be other principal agent problems that may be faced as will be discussed 
below.  
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Time charter Bareboat charter 
Voyage Expenses 
 
 
Fuel 
Port dues 
Canal dues 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Operating expense 
Crewing 
Maintenance 
Repairs 
Surveys 
Insurance 
management 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Capital costs 
Purchase cost 
Interest 
Retrofit 
Dividends 
Debt repayment 
Table 5: Cost allocation in time  and bareboat charter 
6.1.3 Description of principal agent problems 
In the principal agent relationship, the private ferry operator can be described as the agent and the 
appropriate government level authority as the principal wishing to obtain the ferry service. The 
government level authorities are in turn agents for the general public. This creates a chain of 
principals and agents in the delivery of the ferry services, as shown in Figure 11, where, given some 
of the costs and responsibilities mentioned above, each relationship may impose adverse incentives 
towards the energy efficiency of the ferry, discussed in the following sections.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Principal agent relationships in ferry operations 
Passengers Government Ferry operator Ferry owner 
Principal Agent  
 
Principal 
 
Agent  
 
Principal 
 
Agent 
Relationships with potential of split incentives for ferry sustainability 
Owner 
Operator 
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6.1.4 Split incentives due to divided cost responsibility and risk 
The key issue arises as a result of the costs being split between the ownership and operation of the 
vessel, where the operator bears the operating costs (including fuel cost) and the owner bears the 
capital costs. This represents case two of the principal agent problem, as shown in Figure 12, 
resulting in efficiency problems as the charterer cannot select the energy efficiency technology but 
pays for the fuel as a result of the investment decision made by the ferry owner, similar to the 
tenant-landlord scenario discussed in 5.1. This could result in a split incentive efficiency problem, 
because the principal (i.e. ferry charterer or operator) would prefer to have an efficient technology 
or ship that results in lower fuel costs, but their agent the ferry owner is not incentivised because 
they are concerned with initial costs (capital) and not the resultant energy costs. In most cases the 
contracts between the entities in this case are signed after construction (and many years after), 
therefore the principal has little influence over the design, for example when a new ferry operator 
has to take over existing vessels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Case two in ferry operations 
The split between ownership of the vessel and its operator is further exacerbated due to the three 
delivery options and the different types of subsidies that are unique to the provision of ferry 
services. Whether the service is delivered by a publicly-operated, privately-operated or community-
operated entity determines who owns the stake in the operation of the service. However this does 
not govern the provision and ownership of vessels, which can be based on either the operate-only 
contracts or provide-and-operate contracts. For example, a privately-owned operator could be 
contracted via a PSC to provide and operate on a specific route, therefore the provision of the 
service and ownership rests within a single entity, as shown in 
Figure 13. On the other hand, a privately-owned operator could be contracted via a PSC to operate 
on a specific route and the provision of the vessel is from a third party, e.g. the outgoing incumbent 
operator but usually the Government or public body, hence the provision of the service is separated 
from the ownership of the vessel, as shown in Figure 12 above.  
Agent 
Ferry owner vessel 
Principal  
Operator 
Daily B/B 
charter rate 
Energy 
Payments 
Energy efficiency 
investment 
Energy efficiency 
operation 
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Figure 13: Case one, ferry owner and operator as one entity 
6.1.5 Influence of operate-only and provide-and-operate contracts 
on energy efficiency 
Whether the tendered contract should be for operation only (i.e. vessels owned by state) or for 
provision and operation of vessels by operators poses a key issue in sustainable tendering 
(promoting energy efficiency) for ferry services. The pros and cons of each contract and its 
implication on energy efficiency are discussed below. 
Operate-only contract (i.e. government or public body owns or provides the vessel) has the following 
benefits and drawbacks (respectively) on energy efficiency of the vessels: 
 Vessels can be written down over their economic life (around 25 years), rather than over the 
duration of the PSC (generally six years). Owning a vessel for its economic life would make it 
attractive for investment in energy efficiency technology as the payback for these generally 
ranges from a couple of years to ten years. 
 There is certainty for the public body that a vessel will be on a particular route for its economic 
life and as a result the investment in the port and harbour infrastructure (generally in public 
ownership) can also be economically viable. The ship-port configuration leads to further 
efficiency gains, as ships save fuel on manoeuvring, etc.  
 The tendering process can attract competition for routes by minimising the barriers to entry for 
new operators, who would be incentivised to create efficiency through operations. 
 Vessels used in the delivery of the ferry services may be well maintained (e.g. appropriate hull 
coating and hull cleaning regime, due to the long-term vested interest in the vessel. These 
maintenance measures can save a significant amount of the fuel consumed and thereby 
reducing GHG emissions.  
The drawbacks of operate-only contracts are: 
Principal & 
Agent 
Ferry owner 
& operator 
Energy 
Payments 
Energy efficiency 
investment 
Energy 
efficiency 
operation 
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 Bidding firms may be prevented from offering vessels which may be more energy efficient, 
instead having to accept existing vessels which may not be most efficient, which in turn will 
affect the bidding as increased fuel costs need to be taken into account. 
 Central government or the public body has to find the capital to procure newer vessels and 
under existing circumstances this is a challenging task. This affects the fleet turnover and as a 
result very old ships (average age of thirty years) continue to operate on EU waters. The age of 
the ship has been shown to have a negative correlation with fuel or energy efficiency.  
 Operating vessels built almost thirty years ago for meeting current market demands (e.g. 
changes in pax-car ratio and general increase in demand) leads to operational inefficiencies as 
ferries have to increase speed (supply) to meet increased demand. Another example where 
design considerations have an impact on the operational efficiency is the passenger to vehicle 
ratio, where vehicle deck capacity tends to reach full capacity well before passenger capacity as 
a result of over estimating foot passengers (Baird, Wilmsmeier, & Boglev, Scottish Ferries 
Review, Part A: Methods of ferry delivery and operation, competition and procurement, and 
environmental issues, 2010). This in turn determines the crewing level required, which account 
for large proportion of operating costs. 
 Current tendering practices, both net cost and gross cost subsidy contracts do not reward 
operators for in-contract efficiencies as the cost of fuel or energy efficiency is eventually passed 
through (however tendering does reward energy efficiency ex ante by awarding the contract to 
the lowest bids, which can be as a result of cost savings in fuel efficiency or by awarding the 
contract to the MEAT bids, which reveal quality through better energy efficiency). 
Provide-and-operate contract (i.e. operators owns or provides the vessel) has the following benefits 
and drawbacks on energy efficiency of the vessels: 
 The capital investment (capex) in building or buying vessels is borne by the operator, who is 
thought to be able to attract various borrowing facilities and thus freeing the government from 
finding the capital. Because the operator is responsible for both, the capex and opex 
(operational expenditure including fuel), their view on relationship between the two cost items 
(e.g. higher investment in energy efficiency technology with a lower energy bill) may be different 
than when it is split among two different entities. Therefore innovations regarding the design 
and operation of the vessel may appear more readily when vessel ownership is left to the 
operators. 
 Thus operators can select vessels which they consider optimal for each given route, providing in 
their view the most effective, efficient, and economic rather than accepting existing vessels 
specified and provided by the state or state-owned entities. 
 Each subsequent tender offers the opportunity to introduce newer and improved vessels, and 
this may be attractive if energy efficiency technology has advanced over the period. 
The drawbacks of provide-and-operate contracts are: 
 Owner-operators have to recover their investment costs over a limited contract duration and 
may therefore want to depreciate their vessels over much shorter horizon. This impacts on their 
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decision to further invest in energy efficient ships which cost more and may therefore impede 
on the payback period for the investment, although the higher investment or capex may be 
recouped through savings operation in the operation.  
 Since the ports and harbour infrastructure are generally in the ownership of the public body, an 
investment in energy efficiency needs to ensure that it fits in with the current system or 
infrastructure e.g. pontoon interaction with the vessel, mooring (auto mooring) capability, 
double open-ended ferries, etc. This results in ratchet effects (irreversible and stranded assets) 
as some port facilities require specifically designed ferries making investments in ferries 
idiosyncratic, which may act as a barriers to entry for outside firms to participate in the tender. 
 The tendering of routes and the actual provision of the service may create uncertainty and 
insecurity for the bidding operator due to the lead time required to build the vessels, usually two 
years. This means that the provide-and-operate contract needs to be in place in the previous 
contract and consequently the contract may be re-tendered in the current contract.  
 If the bids are assessed on lowest cost criteria and if there is significant cost pass through e.g. 
bunker fuel surcharges, then there may incentives to use older and inefficient vessels. 
 The provision of vessels by operators may suppress competition by creating a barrier to market 
entry for new operators. 
6.1.6 Influence of gross cost and net cost contracts on energy 
efficiency 
The operating cost risk is generally the operator’s risk (e.g. rising maintenance costs and fuel costs) 
and the capital cost risk (purchasing and replacement) may be for the operator, in the provide-and-
operate contract or for the contracting authority in the operate-only contract. Furthermore, revenue 
risk (low demand) can also be transferred to the operator in a net cost contract or retained by the 
authority in a gross cost contract, potentially leading to lack of incentives to enhance the demand 
and consequently revenue but at the same time resulting in lower bids due to lower perceived risk 
by the operator. To some extent, some risks borne by the operator on net cost contracts can be 
transferred to the end-users or passenger, e.g. bunker price increases added as fuel surcharges on 
fares. When fuel costs increase the ferry operator must either increase the fares or increase the fuel 
efficiency to maintain a constant profit margin, although the immediate and short-term response 
may be to pass on the fuel costs in the form of fuel surcharges (Faber, et al., 2009). The ability to 
pass on costs is dependent on the elasticity of the fares to bunker price, which is in turn dependent 
on the price elasticity of demand which in ferry services in some examples has been shown to be 
rather low (-0.3 to -0.4) causing weak incentives for cost efficiency for the operator (Brathen, Hervik, 
Odeck, & Sunde, 2004). Table 6 shows the split of risks in a provide-and-operate and operate-only 
contract for the different entities and Table A1 below shows an example of the split in 
responsibilities in a call for tenders in the context of Scottish ferry services. Table 7 outlines the risks 
appropriated by stakeholders in context of the different delivery services and in of construction of 
new vessels in three states.  
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Provide-and-operate contract on a net cost 
contract 
Operate-only contract on a net cost contract 
Authority is responsible for: 
 Setting the fares for the service 
 Making bye-laws in relation to its operation 
 Running discounted fares scheme 
 Sets service requirements i.e. developed 
the output specification including 
timetable and performance standards; 
 
 
Government is responsible for: 
 Setting policy 
 Procuring operators 
 Sets service requirements i.e. developed 
the output specification including timetable 
and 
 performance standards 
 Directing the use of owned vessels 
 Providing funding for new vessel 
investment. 
Operator is responsible for: 
 Provision and maintenance of the vessels 
 Day to day operation of the service 
 Marketing of the route 
 Collection of fares 
Operator is responsible for: 
 Day to day operation of the service 
 Marketing and revenue generation 
 Collection of fares. 
 
 Vessel owning authority: 
 Ownership, maintenance and replacement 
as necessary of the fleet of vessels; 
 Ownership, management and maintenance 
of piers, harbours, buildings and associated 
 infrastructure; 
 Ownership, safeguarding and ‘licensing’ of 
the brands and other registered 
trademarks. 
Table 6: Split of risks in a provide-and-operate and operate-only contract 
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 Risk Ireland Northern Ireland Scotland 
Construction cost risk Operator Operator Scottish Government 
Design risk Operator Operator Scottish Government 
Specification risk Operator Operator Scottish Government 
Performance risk Operator Operator Operator 
Maintenance risk Operator Operator Operator 
Vessel demand risk Operator Operator Scottish Government 
Residual value risk Operator Scottish 
Government17 & 
operator 
Scottish Government 
 
Table 7: Risks appropriated by stakeholders in context of different delivery services in three states 
Source: Grant Thornton (2010) 
6.1.7 Influence of delivery options on energy efficiency 
The incentives of the publicly-owned, privately-owned and community-owned operators to a large 
extent are dependent on whether they provide the vessels or only operate the vessels as discussed 
above. The key differences between the delivery options generally centre around access to capital or 
lack of finance, which has a direct influence on the renewal of the EU ferry fleet and therefore the 
energy efficiency of the vessels. Although publicly-owned operators maintain they are able to raise 
capital for new-builds at no disadvantage compared with private operators (Baird, Wilmsmeier, & 
Boglev, Scottish Ferries Review, Part A: Methods of ferry delivery and operation, competition and 
procurement, and environmental issues, 2010) their analysis shows that only 10 - 20% of the new 
ferry orders in 2010 were for the account of publicly-owned operators, suggesting private operators 
have been more successful in raising capital and bringing in newer vessels. Comparison of the 
Scottish ferry companies18 and other major European private companies, publicly-owned and 
operated and privately-owned and operated presented in Table 8and Figure 14, shows that the 
average fleet age of privately-owned operators is circa seventeen years compared to publicly-owned 
operators with an average age of twenty one years. 
                                                             
17 Rathlin Island Ferry Ltd (RIFL) uses the ferry (MV Canna) leased as a bareboat charter from Caledonian Macbrayne Assets 
Limited (CMAL) and RIFL (private operator) also owns a pax only ferry in operation in N. Ireland. 
18 The Scottish context is ideal because of the data availability from the Scottish Government on public and private 
operators as well as representing a high proportion of publicly owned and operated ferry companies e.g. councils 
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Figure 14: Average age of vessels owned by public and major private operators 
 
Company Headquarters 
location 
No. of 
vessels 
Average 
age 
Ownership 
Tallink Group EU 11 13 Private 
Blue Star Ferries SA Greece 10 14 Private 
Compagnia Italiana Italy 10 14 Private 
Brittany Ferries France 9 14 Private 
DFDS A/S Denmark 11 15 Private 
Ustica Lines SpA Italy 28 15 Private 
Acciona Trasmed. Spain 10 15 Private 
Wightlink Ltd. UK 13 18 Private 
Stena Line AB EU 19 18 Private 
Transtejo-Transp. Portugal 12 20 Private 
Western Ferries Scotland, UK 5 15 Private (unsubsidised) 
Pentland Ferries Scotland, UK 2 25 Private (unsubsidised) 
John O'Groats Scotland, UK 1 28 Private (unsubsidised) 
CalMac Scotland, UK 29 20 Public 
Northlink Ferries Scotland, UK 2 12 Public 
Orkney Island Council 
Ferries 
Scotland, UK 7 24 Public 
Shetland Council Ferries Scotland, UK 11 22 Public 
Highland Council Scotland, UK 3 33 Public 
Argyll and Bute Council Scotland, UK 1 13 Public 
Table 8: Average age of vessels owned by public and private companies 
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6.1.8 Split incentives due to inability to recoup investments 
affecting sustainable choices 
Section 6.1.3 above highlights the disconnect between capital and operational costs under various 
forms of charter, provide-and-operate and operate-only contracts and the delivery options. Central 
to the split in costs in the aforementioned is the ability of the investing entity to recoup investment 
in energy efficiency. This is primarily a problem in the ferry bareboat charter that is generally used in 
the operate-only contracts. The incentives could be realigned if the investment by the agent, i.e. the 
ferry owner, in energy efficiency could be directly reflected through a higher charter rate charged by 
the agent to the principal who would save on the fuel costs. Thus, the adoption of energy efficiency 
technologies will most likely occur if the adopter can recover the investment from the party that 
enjoys the energy savings. The extent to which the fuel cost savings are passed back to the owner 
through a higher charter rate, i.e. the ability to recoup the investment, has not been investigated 
thoroughly in ferry operations and in shipping. There is difference of opinion in the literature on 
whether investment in energy efficiency is recouped at all and regarding the level of recoupment if 
any. Agnolucci, Smith & Rehmatulla (2014) show that on average 50% of the investment in energy 
efficiency can be recouped in the drybulk Panamax sector, i.e. for every pound of investment in 
energy efficiency the shipowner receives only half the amount through higher charter rates. 
The inability to recoup the investment could in part be due to informational problems or information 
asymmetry meaning that a charterer is not fully able to assess the actual (technical and operational) 
efficiency of the ship and thus not willing to pay a higher rate to reflect this prior to signing the 
contract. This in turn could be because the ferry owner is not able to portray the energy efficiency of 
the ship (i.e. lacks information due to lack of monitoring) to be able to reflect the charter rate.  
In the situation where there is an operate-only contract and the vessel is provided by the state (or 
relevant authority), the key questions then are: 
 How much can the government agency recoup, if new energy efficient vessel is provided, 
through higher bareboat charter rate (i.e. premium), and  
 How does this affect the operator’s costs (since a newer and efficient ship will benefit from fuel 
and maintenance efficiencies) and therefore subsidies. That is, do newer and efficient ships 
owned and managed by government result in lower subsidies? 
6.1.9 Split incentives due to tendering durations affecting 
sustainable choices 
The EU regulations do not set a maximum duration for PSCs but does provide that they should be of 
a limited duration in order to allow regular and open competition in the market. The guidance issued 
by the EC on the duration of tendering periods or concession length is six years. Currently, however 
the EC preferred duration is not reflected in practice, as shown in Table 9. In some instances, 
contracts for subsidised ferry services are as short as one year (e.g. Greece) and as long as a decade 
(e.g. Italy). 
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The mismatch of the ‘preferred’ or limited concession lengths and vessel life (circa 25 years) may 
impact the operator’s ability to procure newer or invest in energy efficient vessels and finance them 
over the contract period. There is inconclusive evidence on whether the preferred concession length 
discourages potential operators from procuring new and energy efficient vessels. Grant Thornton 
(2010) suggests that there is evidence to support this argument from previous tendering exercises in 
Northern Ireland and Ireland. On the other hand (Baird, Wilmsmeier, & Boglev, Scottish Ferries 
Review, Part A: Methods of ferry delivery and operation, competition and procurement, and 
environmental issues, 2010) suggest that EU case studies carried out as part of the review suggest 
that the tendering period is not necessarily as significant a constraint as might be thought in terms of 
the provision of new ships being brought in by bidders. In Norway, Sweden and Denmark new ships 
have been introduced by operators as part of six year contracts. Moreover, the review provides 
some evidence that suggests that new ships provided in the first round of tenders continue to be 
used in the subsequent rounds.  
Therefore, the view that bidders providing vessels on six year contracts would have to fully amortise 
their investment over the period, may not hold. It is suggested (Baird, Wilmsmeier, & Boglev, 
Scottish Ferries Review, Part A: Methods of ferry delivery and operation, competition and 
procurement, and environmental issues, 2010) that this is reflective of current practice as 
amortisation over a six year period leads to considerable costs in the calculation of the 
compensation or subsidy and, therefore, not competitive on cost terms. Thus, some operators with a 
long-term view will seek to pitch a lower bid by depreciating over the lifetime of the vessel in the 
hope of winning subsequent rounds as well, as suggested by operators’ comments in the review.  
The limited tendering duration argument is closely linked to the pros and cons of provide-and-
operate and operate-only contracts, discussed in section 6.1.5. On the one hand, a centralised state 
ship-owning company could invest in newer and efficient ships and facilitate the transfer of ships to 
subsequent operate-only operators at the end of each contract, on the other hand if the investment 
is not taking place than it may counteract the benefits of provide-and-operate contracts, where 
operators may propose to use more efficient ships.  
The tendering process that is open to alternative ship solutions generally does not reflect the sunk 
costs and additional risk that may be taken by the investing entity. Thus a company may invest in a 
vessel which wins it an initial contract but in the subsequent tenders it is found that offers submitted 
by other bidders proposing alternative lower cost ship solutions are more cost competitive. Current 
practice to avoid stranded assets and to better reflect the sunk costs in assets is to state that the 
ship is ‘so specific’ that it has to be used for subsequent contract periods; thus no bidder is able to 
propose an alternative lower cost option (Baird, Wilmsmeier, & Boglev, Scottish Ferries Review, Part 
A: Methods of ferry delivery and operation, competition and procurement, and environmental 
issues, 2010). 
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Country Duration (years, average 
or range) 
Denmark 5  
Estonia 5 & 10 
Finland 2 - 5 
France 5 - 7 
Greece 1 -12 
Italy 20 
Ireland 1 – 5 
Malta 6 
Portugal 2 
Spain 5 
Sweden 4 + 2 
UK  2 + 1, 6 
Iceland 3 – 6 
Table 9: Approximate durations of tender periods in various EU countries 
Source: Baird, Wilmsmeier & Boglev (2010) 
                         
6.1.10 Split incentives due to public service obligations 
contract  
PSOs or PSCs are required to guarantee a minimum level of service to a particular community when 
such services might not be commercially viable. Some operators suggest that commercial viability 
depends on how a service is provided (as governed by the PSO or PSC) (Baird, Wilmsmeier, & Boglev, 
Scottish Ferries Review, Part A: Methods of ferry delivery and operation, competition and 
procurement, and environmental issues, 2010), thus operators may be able to operate without 
subsidies in some instances if they have the freedom to operate as they choose, rather than operate 
to a prescriptive service specification.  
Some of the funding models used to compensate ferry operators through subsidies may not provide 
incentives to the operator to operate efficiently and therefore energy efficiency may not be 
effectively rewarded. Examples of these are subsidies which include a graduated clawback 
mechanism to conform with EU rules in respect of maritime PSOs.  Although the operators are 
expected to make a ‘reasonable financial return’, any resulting profit or financial return over and 
above a certain amount is usually clawed back, disincentivising profit maximisation objectives of 
privately-owned operators. On the other hand, an operator that does not make a profit is fully 
subsidised and therefore cushioned against such a loss. Thus the graduated clawback mechanism 
creates perverse incentives for the operators. 
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Baird, Wilmsmeier & Boglev (2010) suggest that to create sufficient incentives for the operator, 
especially in the Scottish context where the clawback is generally used, the clawback could be 
limited to 50%, instead of the current practice of 95%, thereby giving the operator more incentives 
to maximise profit, which could come about as a result of increased revenue, e.g. from additional 
traffic, or as a result of cost control, e.g. from energy efficient investment and operations. 
Furthermore, in some circumstances perverse incentives can be seen when a subsidised operator 
and a non-subsidised operator operate on similar routes. The private operators with a profit 
maximising goal (can generate additional revenue through additional traffic) may lead to equivalent 
increase in the subsidy of the subsidised operator (who loses out on the traffic to the private 
operator). However, in most cases investigated by Baird, Wilmsmeier & Boglev (2010) contracting 
authorities do not impose profit clawback mechanisms on operators. Once the service arrangements 
are agreed, including maximum prices, there seems no need to constrain profits and hence to 
reduce incentives for operators to make profit through further service enhancements, new market 
development, etc. This is another example of lack of standardised application of EU policy on the 
subject of ferry procurement by member states in their PSOs and PSCs which could potentially be 
affecting investment in energy efficiency as a measure to reduce costs and improve profits.  
6.1.11 Split incentives due to multiple principal agent 
relationships (longer chain) 
As highlighted in section 6.1.2, there are various forms of delivering ferry services. Each of these can 
contain multiple relationships instead of the one principal and one agent scenarios described above. 
The implication of this is that energy efficiency may not be a priority for different entities in the 
chain as a result of different cost responsibilities, energy price shielding and other constraints. An 
example of this is the trade-off between sailing time and operational energy efficiency that could be 
achieved from slower crossings. Based on the rule of thumb, a 10% reduction in speed results in 
nearly 30% reduction of power requirements, thus speed reduction is considered to have one of the 
highest impact on energy efficiency (Smith, Parker & Rehmatulla, 2011). In ferries it is estimated that 
in a large ROPAX ferry a reduction of 0.5 knots would result in 20% reduction in CO2 emissions whilst 
only adding five minutes to a two hour journey (Scottish Government, 2011). 
One of the costs passengers bear is the value of their time, the reduction in travel time made 
possible by faster ferries significantly reduces passengers’ total cost. Thus, if slower crossings are 
introduced or proposed in order to improve operational energy efficiency, then other aspects of the 
ferry services may be at risk, e.g. revenue. On the other hand a reduction in speed may reduce the 
fares but the extent to which this will be reflected will depend on the transparency of fuel 
surcharges and cost pass through. Baird, Wilmsmeier & Boglev (2010) and Scottish Government 
(2011) showed that operators and passengers in general would not support reduction in vessel 
speeds as a means for improving energy efficiency and reducing emissions. Therefore the current 
fare systems across all the EU countries could have failed to take into account the external costs 
relating to the environment, therefore foregoing options that might be cost-effective from a social 
perspective but not from a private perspective. 
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In specific contexts such as the Greek ferry market which has witnessed a high fleet turnover, newer 
ships are twice as fast as the ships they replaced and as a result travel times have almost been 
halved in some routes, e.g. Piraeus to Chania reduced to just over five hours from ten hours. 
Similarly in Gotland where newer vessels with lower speeds were proposed, the stakeholders 
(islanders and island businesses) suggested that it may put at risk development of tourism and local 
businesses, therefore faster crossings must be considered of high value in the bidding process. This 
very clearly highlights the fine balance that is required in environmental policies to mitigate global 
impacts (e.g. GHG emissions) versus local impacts (e.g. SOx and NOx).  
Another important aspect of the multiple principal agent relationships in the tendering process is the 
split of responsibilities and costs in different public organisations in terms of managing the tender 
process, service delivery, operations including harbour services. Currently there is no consistency in 
the responsibility of managing the whole spectrum of the ferry services. In some EU countries 
responsibility is split between the central government, local authorities and regional transport 
partnerships (e.g. Scotland) compared to some countries where the responsibility lies with only one 
public body such as the central government (e.g. Greece). Where there may exist several public 
authorities in managing the delivery of ferry services, it is likely that it will give rise to split incentives 
as different authorities will bear different costs and in their efforts to reduce the costs allocated to 
them, and may therefore forego the benefits that would have accrued if it were just one entity. This 
can be witnessed in the jurisdictions which have adopted the operate-only contracts, where the 
operator is generally not the entity responsible for vessels and has little control over the harbours 
and port infrastructure. On the subject of harbours and port infrastructure, there can be various 
configurations that lead to multiple principal agent relationships. In some cases the central 
government delegates the ownership of harbours and ports to councils or local authorities who then 
delegate the operation to a contractor, which may or may not be the operator of the ferry service, 
as shown in Figure 15. The effect of this longer chain of relationship in the context of energy 
efficiency is that: 
 There may be a disconnect in the optimal ferry design to match the port and harbour 
infrastructure 
 The infrastructure could be give rise to inefficient ferry operations, e.g. a lack of pontoons may 
increase waiting times for ferry berthing and therefore increase fuel consumption 
 The ports and harbour infrastructure maintenance or lack of maintenance could result in poor 
operational efficiency, e.g. dredging.  
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Figure 15: Multiple principal agent relationships in the context of ports and harbours 
 
6.2 Other barriers that may be hindering sustainable choices in 
ferry procurement 
Apart from the split incentives arising from principal agent relationships (as discussed in 6.1) there 
could also be other factors that contribute to the slow diffusion and adoption of energy efficient 
measures. These factors are referred to as non-market failures and include; heterogeneity, risk, 
hidden costs and access to capital, all viable propositions in the context of ferry procurement.  
Restricted access to capital markets is often considered to be an important barrier to investing in 
energy efficiency. Investments in energy efficiency may not be profitable because companies also 
face a high price for capital. As a result, only investments yielding an expected return that exceeds 
this (high) hurdle rate will be realised (Schleich & Grubber, 2008). Capital rationing is often used 
within firms as an allocation means for investments leading to hurdle rates that are much higher 
than the cost of capital, especially for small projects. This leads to competition between projects 
within a company and may lead to low priority given to energy efficiency (Bhattacharyya, 2011). If 
improving energy efficiency comes at the cost of forgoing other more cost-effective opportunities 
(because of capital or labour constraints or because the projects are mutually exclusive alternatives), 
it would be rational for the firm to give energy efficiency a low priority (Faber, et al., 2009). As an 
example, a ferry owner-operator currently has to decide between investing in a scrubber technology 
given the regulations around SOx and NOx emissions or improve the energy efficiency of ships given 
the increasing fuel price.  
Where the central government or other public bodies provide vessels, it may be difficult to provide 
energy efficient ferries from existing or traditional sources of funding amidst difficult ongoing budget 
cutbacks. Furthermore, more investment may also be required from the public authorities to 
improve ports and harbours, further constraining the investment budgets. As an example, the 
Scottish Government in its review (Baird, Wilmsmeier, & Boglev, Scottish Ferries Review, Part A: 
Central Government Local authority Contractor Ferry operator 
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Methods of ferry delivery and operation, competition and procurement, and environmental issues, 
2010) estimated that there is a need for around £1 billion to fund investment in new ships and 
upgrading piers and harbours, in addition to the £120 – 130 million per annum in subsidies.  
Another factor affecting the procurement of efficient ferry services is related to the perception of 
costs. The following costs may impede on the decision on whether or not to invest in energy efficient 
ferries or retrofits: 
 
Life cycle costs - Costs relating to the energy efficient option’s life cycle costs including: identification 
or search costs, project appraisal costs, commissioning costs, disruption or opportunity costs and 
additional/specific engineering costs. 
 
Transactional costs – Transaction costs and other unobserved cost items may render apparently 
cost-effective measures costly. Especially, smaller ferry owner-operators may experience high 
transaction costs as they cannot spread the costs of, for example, gathering information over a large 
number of ships (Faber, et al., 2009). The transactional costs are additional to the costs of tendering 
which on their own have been described as very high (Baird, Wilmsmeier, & Boglev, Scottish Ferries 
Review, Part A: Methods of ferry delivery and operation, competition and procurement, and 
environmental issues, 2010), to the extent that it is considered to be a disincentive to private 
operators who have to bear the costs themselves. Furthermore (Baird, Wilmsmeier, & Boglev, 
Scottish Ferries Review, Part A: Methods of ferry delivery and operation, competition and 
procurement, and environmental issues, 2010) shows that gross-cost term contracts have higher 
transaction costs. 
 
Commissioning or disruption costs - Some measures to reduce emissions require retrofits that can 
only be installed by temporarily suspending operations. These measures are very costly to 
implement except at times when the ferry may be off-service e.g. on dry-dock, such as major 
maintenance of installations. There may therefore be a lag between the time when a measure 
becomes available and its actual implementation. Retrofits to existing ferries such as the installation 
of wind or solar power, waste heat recovery systems etc. can only be done cost-effectively when a 
ferry undergoes a major overhaul during a dry-dock. This causes a time-lag of several years in the 
implementation of cost-effective measures. 
 
Further to the above, there may be certain risks such as regulatory, technological and market related 
risks that could potentially impede sustainability choices in delivering sustainable and efficient ferry 
services. An example of regulatory risk combined with technological risk is the current ECA rules and 
the inherent uncertainty associated with the measures to meet these requirements, e.g. uncertainty 
in the price of LSFO (or HFO) and scrubber technology developments. In the context of ferry 
tendering there are several market related risks stemming from supply and demand. It is more than 
likely that any operating subsidies are based on expectation of future demand/patronage, which can 
be directly linked to the ferry policy of the relevant authority, e.g. Road Equivalent Tariff (RET). The 
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inherent uncertainty of future demand may disincentivise investment in energy efficiency as it 
directly affects the revenue streams or future cash-flows to enable payback of the energy efficient 
ferry or energy efficient measure. On the supply side, the procurement of second-hand energy 
efficient ferries could be potentially affected by the illiquid nature of the second-hand sale and 
purchase market and the opaque nature of the charter market due to non-transferrable and purpose 
built vessels. 
In summary, the principal agent analysis suggests various problems that potentially affect the 
decisions of the stakeholders or entities responsible to make sustainable and energy efficient 
choices when delivering ferry services. Table 10 below is a summary of the foregoing analysis.  
Table 10: Summary of principal agent problems in delivery of ferry services 
Problems Explanation Mainly affecting 
Split responsibility 
for capital and 
operational costs 
The entity investing in technical energy efficiency is 
different from the one bearing the cost of the energy 
efficiency. 
Operate-only 
contracts 
Short term tendering 
periods compared to 
life of ships 
According to EU tendering requirements there is a 
disconnect between the duration of ferry life and 
tender period durations. 
Provide-and-
operate contracts 
Lack of information 
on energy efficiency 
of ships 
Operational energy efficiency data is also seldom 
recorded and this lack of information is also due to 
lack of accurate measurement.  
Operate-only 
contracts 
Time chartered 
ferries 
Operators lack of  
full control over 
operations 
Although in commercial control of the ship, the 
operator does not own the vessel nor employ the 
crew on-board ships in some cases 
Operate-only 
contracts 
Bareboat charter 
rates may not reflect 
energy efficiency 
proportionally 
The savings in fuel costs made by the operator as a 
result of an energy efficient ship are not fully passed 
back to the ferry owner in the form of proportionally 
higher bareboat charter rates.  
Operate-only 
contracts 
Fixed schedules and 
passenger costs 
resulting in poorer 
energy  efficiency 
PSCs stipulate require strict adherence to service 
frequency, regularity and sailing times and 
passengers place a premium on faster speeds, 
whereas the fares do not take into account the 
negative effects from a wider, social or climate 
Operate-only and 
provide-and-
operate contracts 
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perspective. 
Short term duration 
of time charters  
Over 90% of time charters in shipping are for less 
than two years, therefore it does not permit 
operators getting payback from the investment in 
technical and some operational efficiency measures.  
Time chartered 
ferries 
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7 Test of carbon cost modelling and economic cost 
modelling for commercial operations 
 UCL Energy Institute employs a variety of methods in its research including data analysis and 
modelling.  These models have been used when predicting future scenarios related to maritime 
transport and global shipping trends.  The outputs have gone on to influence policy development, 
such as the study of greenhouse gas emissions from ships (the Third IMO GHG Study 2014) 
commissioned by the International Maritime Organisation as an update to the Second IMO GHG 
Study 2009.   
One of the models used in the institute is GloTraM (Global Transport Model), which is a techno-
economic model that can produce estimates of international shipping’s GHG emissions as a 
function of a macro-economic scenario (trade), price data (fuel and carbon) and other policy. Other 
outputs also include the impacts of policy on transport costs. GloTraM combines multi-disciplinary 
analysis and modelling techniques to estimate foreseeable futures of the shipping industry. The 
model starts with a definition of the global shipping system in a baseline year (2010) and then 
evolves the fleet and its activity in response to external stimuli (changing fuel prices, transport 
demand, regulation and technology availability). The conceptual framework used is shown in Figure 
16.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: GloTraM19 
                                                             
19 Details on the model, related publications and documents are available from www.lowcarbonshipping.co.uk 
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The GloTraM model is underpinned by rigorous analysis of the existing fleet, along with the 
economics of technology investment and operation in the shipping industry. This approach ensures 
that the model closely resembles the behaviour of the stakeholders within the shipping industry and 
their decision making processes to ensure realistic simulation of their likely response to new 
external stimuli (such as introduction of a carbon price or carbon price fluctuations).  
GloTraM was initially developed by the RCUK Energy programme and an industry (Shell, Lloyd’s 
Register, BMT and Rolls-Royce) funded project “Low Carbon Shipping – A Systems Approach”. It 
has since been further developed through a number of further projects including the project 
“Shipping in Changing Climates”.  
The model has applications for greenhouse gas mitigation policy development (both Command and 
Control and Market Based Measures) on global (International Maritime Organisation), regional and 
national scales. In addition to policy impact, the model is in use in a number of multi-national 
organisations for assistance in strategic decision making. To date the model has been used to 
inform the International Energy Association (IEA) on future shipping trends, Lloyds Register and 
Shell on alternative fuel scenarios. The model also analyses a number of non-GHG emissions and air 
pollutants, for which there are also policy applications.  
As a result of leading the IMO Third GHG Study in 2014, UCL Energy Institute now has an additional 
suite of models and data (for an example of this type of data, see Figure 17) for ferries that can be 
used to characterize the EU ferry sector at a more granular level. The EU sea regions have some of 
the highest coverage quality with this type of data, due to the large number of shore base stations. 
Using the models developed for the IMO 3rd GHG Study, this data can now be used to assess fuel 
use and CO2 emissions in EU North Sea Region as well as historic trends of these (Figure 18, Figure 
19, Figure 20).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Chart showing the coverage AIS datasets used in this IMO Third GHG study  
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Figure 18: Bottom-up CO2 emissions from international shipping by ship type 2012 (Source: Smith 
et al. (2014)) 
Data from 2012 shipping information (Figure 18) identifies that ferries deliver 28 million tonnes of 
CO2 emissions, and this represents a small proportion of the total emissions from international 
shipping.  Fuel consumption within the ferry sector, as with other ship types, predominantly 
originates from the main engines (Figure 19).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Summary graph of annual fuel consumption broken down by ship type and machinery 
2012 
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Figure 20: CO2 emissions by ship type (international shipping only) calculated using the bottom-up 
method for all years (2007–2012). 
Historical trends reviewing global CO2 emissions from the shipping industry demonstrate that 
between 2007 and 2012 the emissions from RoPax ferries have decreased.  This could reflect the 
increases in efficiencies that have been delivered by operators, or reflect the challenging financial 
conditions of ferry operations that has led many lines to reduce their routes, so the trend reflects 
not a greening of the ferry sector but a reduction in ferry services available.   
The addition of ferry data into the 3rd IMO GHG report enables further research into this data set to 
uncover the trends and future directions and challenges for the ferry sector.  These global trends 
will help EU policy makers and ferry operators to understand priorities for action when it comes to 
operations and application of innovation.  While the global contribution to GHG emissions from the 
sector may be small, it is still important to focus on the improvements that can be delivered and the 
opportunities for ferries as an innovation test bed.  
Smith (2012) presents a modelling framework that can be used to examine the technical energy 
efficiency and its economic interaction and simulate what might be commercially optimum in 
foreseeable future scenarios. The results suggest that operation to maximize a ship owner’s profits 
negates the benefit in emissions reductions achieved through technology. If the mitigation actions 
of technology are both to be optimized and protected from potential operational rebound affects 
(speed increases), it is important to understand these interactions and take them into account in the 
design of GHG-related policy.  
A current trend from the freight sector is the increase in ‘slow steaming’.  This entails reducing the 
speed of bulk cargo ships, increasing the shipment times, but reducing the power outputs, 
delivering fuel and cost savings.  A similar approach could be taken in relation to ferry operations.  If 
timetables and contracts could be amended to enable a reduction in crossing speed and an increase 
in transfer times, this could realise additional financial and environmental benefits, for operators. 
For example, the Scottish Government estimate that in a large ROPAX ferry a speed reduction of 
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0.5 knots would result in 20% reduction in CO2 emissions whilst only adding five minutes to a two 
hour journey (Scottish Government 2011).  
The carbon cost model available could be of significant benefit for the ferry industry as they look to 
realise efficiency savings and deliver sustainable transport choices for their passengers.   
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8 Development of a business case for a post project “low 
carbon shipping group”  
By linking the iTransfer project with UCL Energy Institute a natural link to the low carbon shipping 
network was achieved. UCL Energy Institute was one of the first universities in the UK and the EU 
which established this group through its involvement in the ‘Low Carbon Shipping – A Systems 
Approach’ project funded by the UK Research Council (RCUK EP/H020012/1) in 2009. The project 
brought together five universities and key industry partners such as Lloyds Register, Rolls Royce, 
BMT, Maersk and Shell. This network has been fostered since to contain the leading industry and 
academic institutions and this has been accelerated with a follow up RCUK funded project, Shipping 
in Changing Climates, a ~£4m multi-university and a cross-industry partnership project. The group 
has in its portfolio some high profile projects, including the recently completed ‘IMO Third GHG 
study’ and Lloyds Register Global Marine Fuel Trends and various others, details of which can be 
found at www.lowcarbonshipping.co.uk.  The group continues to forward its agenda on low carbon 
shipping through its quarterly forums and annual academic & industry conferences.   
The common link established, through the UCL Energy Institute, between the iTransfer project 
partners and the Low Carbon Shipping Group and Shipping in Changing Climates project has 
facilitated a valuable knowledge exchange. The iTransfer partnership has gained access to a large 
amount of detailed research data, testing and knowledge relating to carbon reduction and 
emissions control in the global shipping area while, at the same time, the Low Carbon Shipping 
Group and  Shipping in Changing Climates project have had access to the knowledge and 
experience of ferry operators within the iTransfer project, providing data and information from real-
world situations in the ferry sector. This has become especially pertinent since the UCL Energy 
Institute have recently been able to include AIS data specifically relating to ferries in their 
information gathering and modelling. It is anticipated that the links and relationships established 
will continue beyond the lifetime of the iTransfer project, with partners participating in a continuing 
low carbon shipping group. 
8.1 Wider impacts and bringing innovation to the South Pacific 
Work conducted by UCL Energy Institute (as a subcontractor to Institute for Sustainability) in work 
package five contained a report that examined EU ferry policies with specific focus on public 
procurement and tendering of ferry services in the North Sea Region and the sustainability issues 
(specifically energy efficiency and GHGs) in the procurement of ferry services. UCL Energy Institute 
has subsequently partnered with University of the South Pacific (USP)  a regional university 
servicing 12 Pacific Island countries, to leverage on the findings generated in iTransfer to investigate 
similar issues for Pacific Island countries and communities. Such communities rely heavily on 
relatively small and generally old ferries as their primary transport mode between the islands.  The 
Pacific is the most dependent region in the world on imported fossil fuels (more than 95% 
dependent)  and over 70% of the fossil fuel consumption in the region is for transport fuels. For 
some countries maritime transport is the majority fuel user and for all a significant user.20 .Thus the 
                                                             
20 Nuttall, P., et al. (2013). A review of sustainable sea-transport for Oceania: Providing context for renewable energy 
shipping for the Pacific. Marine Policy: 43: 283–287 
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efficiency of ferries is crucial for these Small Island Developing State (SIDS). Moreover the need to 
investigate energy efficiency in publicly provided ferry services are of a high importance to the 
islands as it attempts to build resilience or ‘climate change proofing’ for the island and its 
communities. On the other hand the ferry transport in the islands will also be adversely impacted by 
the forthcoming international regulations such as SOx emissions (MARPOL Annex VI) which will 
contribute to an estimated 60%21 increase in marine fuel costs. Recent UNCTAD analysis confirms 
that such SIDS will be disproportionally affected by such price increases comparative to all other 
countries and regions22. 
Currently ferry transport is limited to infrequent commercial ferry services (in most parts of the 
island) and outboard driven punts. The Fiji Government, for example, subsidises the ferries through 
its Shipping Franchise Scheme to ensure commercial operators service those routes classified as 
‘uneconomic’, for which there would otherwise be no regular services or physical connectivity. The 
routes operating subsidised ferries are of twice the replacement age (e.g. MV Sandy Lady, MV Spirit 
of Fiji Islands) compared to newer efficient ferries that operate on economical routes23. The 
disconnect in efficiency of ferries suggests that there may be similar challenges (to that being faced 
in the North Sea Region) which is faced in many parts of the world where public procurement of 
ferries takes place.  Poor strategic procurement decisions in recent years in several Pacific instances 
have seen unseaworthy vessels founder with subsequent tragic loss of life. Initial consultation with 
Pacific stakeholders at regional agency, government and industry levels indicates a strong interest 
in this field and a desire to learn from lessons being developed elsewhere. 
  
                                                             
21
  
Bola, A 2014, 'Potential for sustainable sea transport: A case study of the Southern Lomaiviti, Fiji Islands', Shipping in 
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9 Concluding remarks and policy recommendations 
This report presents for the first time a systematic analysis of the sustainability issues faced in the 
public procurement of ferry services. Using the principal agent theory and framework developed in 
similar studies in other sectors, the report highlights potential problems that are being faced by 
stakeholders in the procurement process of ferry services in EU, energy efficiency and CO2 
emissions. Existing research has shown that in some EU ferry services there exist up to 30% cost 
efficiency gains, suggesting production costs (e.g. labour, capital, fuel) are not minimised, thus 
energy efficiency savings and CO2 emission reductions are foregone. According to the foregoing 
analysis this arises mainly as a result of the capital and operating costs being divided between the 
different entities, where the operator bears the operating costs (including fuel cost) and the owner 
bears the capital costs, arising either as a result of different type of charters or provide-and-operate 
and operate-only contracts. This is further exacerbated due to multiple principal agent relationships 
in the delivery of ferry services and some peculiarities of the public procurement processes (e.g. 
clawback mechanisms). There was inconclusive evidence on whether the limited tendering periods 
actually disincentivise investment in newer and energy efficient ferries. This is one of the areas 
where further work is clearly beneficial. Further data can be obtained through interviews with 
industry stakeholders to provide a more complete and valid picture of the issues presented.  
CO2 emissions from the ropax and pax-only vessels represented around 3% of shipping emissions in 
2012 and given the growth of the sector in the last two decades, it is likely that this proportion will 
increase in response to increase in demand and absence of policies, despite the efficiency gains and 
technological innovations in the sector. To some extent the regional EU MRV regulation is the first 
policy instrument aiming to address CO2 emissions, although the efficacy of the policy is debatable. 
The Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) for ferries being discussed at IMO (mandatory for other 
new-build ships since 2013) would create further incentives for ferry owners and operators to 
improve the design efficiency of the ferries and to some extent will address the split in cost for 
owning an energy efficient ferry and operating an energy efficient ferry. The most important policy 
could be to improve the operational or in-service efficiency of ferries, which would bring energy 
efficiency and sustainability to centre stage in the public procurement of ferries. This could be 
achieved from various instruments ranging from command and control measures to market based 
measures that put a price on emissions, therefore internalising the social or environmental costs and 
incentivising efficient operations. The implications and effectiveness of such a policy need to be 
carefully considered, given the pervasiveness of the principal agent problem in the public 
procurement of ferry services. 
If energy efficiency and climate change are important to both the member states and EU then there 
needs to be a holistic approach to public procurement of ferries. Whilst there have been attempts to 
incorporate sustainability through energy efficiency in tenders, much more could be done to 
highlight its importance. When there aren’t economic incentives (as highlighted in the report) to 
conserve fuel due to various reasons, then there is a greater need for a policy to drive 
implementation of energy efficiency. As an example standard policies could be adopted that 
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specifically score bids on energy efficiency, rather than scoring on broader ‘quality’ or ‘environment’ 
criteria.  
Innovative financing models that require zero capital expenditure from the ferry owner and 
operator can be instrumental to overcome split incentives that arise as result of contractual 
arrangements and duration which affect the implementation of some energy efficiency measures 
requiring larger initial outlay. 
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11 Appendix 
Table A1: An example of the split in responsibilities in a call for tenders in the context of Scottish 
ferry services 
Source: The Scottish Government (2003) 
 
Operator 
Executive/VesCo Shared/ 
Negotiable 
Comment 
Vessel design 
 
   
Vessel 
construction/leasing 
 
   
Commissioning risk 
 
   
Operational 
risk(vessels) 
 
   
Policy risk   
 
Policy risk not involving 
legislation 
Demand for volume 
risks 
 
  Risk that demand for service 
does not match the levels 
planned 
Maintenance risk 
for harbours 
 
 
 Primarily for VesCo 
Maintenance risk 
for vessels 
 
   
Inflation risk   
 
 
Legislative risks   
 
Depends on circumstances. 
Corporation tax, etc., would 
fall to operator. Scottish 
Executive legislation would be 
public sector. MCA Regs may 
be either depending on the 
circumstances 
Change in 
requirements of 
transport policy 
 
 
 For example, a change in EC or 
Govt policy in relation to 
subsidisation of shipping 
operators 
Incorrect cost or 
time estimates for 
providing services 
 
   
Failure to meet 
specified service 
levels 
 
   
Force majeure   
 
 
Industrial action 
 
  For contractor's staff in 
relation to CHFS contract. See 
section on relief events in 
relation to industrial action 
outwith the contractor's 
control 
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Failure to meet  
performance 
standards 
 
   
Capital expenditure 
- Vessels 
 
  The operator responsible for 
provision of vessels. 
Capital expenditure 
- ports 
 
 
  
TUPE costs at start 
of contract 
  
 
Tenderers are asked to bid as if 
TUPE applies and therefore 
subsidy will reflect this. 
However, any errors in the bid 
will fall to operators 
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